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Introduction 3
Foreword
This report (Part A) is an interpretation of the statistical results (Part B) of this publication. 
The research project is called The Housing Regime of Sweden: Concurrent Challenges, and it 
has been funded by the Academy of Finland. The project was part of a research consortium 
called Finnish Housing Regime in Transition. Other partners of the consortium were the 
University of Turku (prof. Hannu Ruonavaara) and the University of Helsinki (prof. Anne 
Haila).
The project plan was written and the project was conducted by the author of these lines. 
Persons taking part in the project were MSc Ilona Akkila, MSc Jukka Hirvonen and MSc 
Aino Verkasalo. Some of the efforts of Mr Hirvonen and Ms Verkasalo are found in Part B. 
Each author is fully responsible for his or her contribution. 
The need for elaborating a critical review of the Swedish housing regime has emerged 
from the fact that:
Swedish housing has for decades been made known in many countries, and it has often 
been used as an example of how the “housing question” could be successfully addressed.
Despite its fame, critical scrutinizing of Swedish housing is fairly rare, and it is increasingly 
doubtful whether the experiences of one country are applicable to the context of other 
countries. 
Consequently, the analysis of housing has to be contextualised, which here is carried out 
by analysing the housing regime of Sweden.
Hopefully this report will generate some discussion and contribute to fruitful amendments 
of prevailing housing practices both in Sweden and in Finland. All the researchers of this 
project are open for questions and arguments, and look forward to contribute to further 
discussions on the issues of this report.
Espoo September 2015
Christer Bengs
Professor emeritus (SLU), Chief Researcher (Aalto)
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Introduction
In economic research, two traditions may be distinguished. Mainstream economics 
adhere to the so-called formalist approach where the study of rational decision-making 
and the consideration of individuals is placed in focus. In this tradition, housing would 
typically be discussed in terms of consumers’ choices. Alternatively, there is to be found 
a broader scope labelled the substantivist approach: economy is viewed in the context 
of relationships and material acts of making a living. In this latter school of thought, the 
society and its institutions are consequently placed in focus. Housing would accordingly 
be viewed in terms of institutions and traditions, in order to connect factual market 
mechanisms to the various ways they have emerged in history, and to how they reflect 
diverse interests and politics.1  
The study at hand certainly reflects less a formalist than a substantivist approach. This 
is not to say that one way would be better or more fruitful than the other as any chosen 
approach depends on matter under scrutiny. Here, the subject of investigation is the 
Swedish housing regime, which of course is a broader concept than that of housing 
market. As a rule, housing is a phenomenon, which involves other societal institutions 
than markets only. It includes reciprocity across society as a general kind of helping 
and sharing, in particular among family members and relatives. In return for housing, 
remuneration would typically take the form of various services, which do not necessarily 
have to be instant or even be directed to the initial benefactor, but may rather constitute 
a general pattern of assistance and gratification. Another form of distribution of goods is 
redistribution, indicating a central authority who collects and redistributes resources. 
Housing policy has very much emerged from the need to allocate dwellings according to 
factual needs, not only responding to effective demand. Still, in most countries, housing 
is distributed as part of exchange, that is, calculated trade of the marketplace. Different 
combinations of these distributive modes have been found in all societies, but usually one 
is dominant at a time.2 In modern societies, distribution based on exchange is prevalent. 
1  Only in the historical development of the modern West did the two approaches get the same meaning, 
with the emergence of the marketplace and the flow of financial assets. ”Economy” changed from being 
a matter for households to being a matter for states in 16th century Europe with the emergence of nation 
states. Kishtainy et al. 2012, 34–35
2  Wilk & Cliggett 2007, 31-47
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However, as we will learn later, Sweden is actually an exception, where a considerable part 
of the dwelling stock is not distributed through markets.
A market is created whenever potential sellers of a good or service are brought into contact 
with potential buyers and a means of exchange (money or barter) is available. A free 
market indicates that supply and demand are not subject to other regulation than normal 
competition policy, and that property rights are allocated and upheld so that trade can 
occur. However, this definition becomes blurred in cases where free trade and competition 
are incompatible.3 In any particular case, the local housing market is exclusive as the 
supply of land is locally limited and property rights may not be equal to all categories of 
effective demand. Such conditions foster local oligopolies and monopolies in housing. 
Other categories of land use, such as agriculture and forestry, transport, energy supply, 
other utilities, are featured by natural monopolies as well. Land use is as a rule subjected to 
strong restrictions to competition and may enhance economic concentration on the local 
level. Accordingly, the structure of a housing market can be analysed in terms of restrictions 
to enter the market and to the degree of rivalry within that market. Furthermore, market 
analysis require an understanding of the scope of a market as to its extension. A local 
economy would thus be characterised by the match between local consumption and 
local production. In the perspective of globalisation, there is only one marketplace. The 
composition of any given marketplace would be a function of its structure and scope. The 
homes available would thus be explained in relation the nature and degree of occurring 
restrictions and rivalry as well as to the geographical extension of the marketplace.
Mainstream economists of a neoliberal moulding have strongly advocated a limited role of 
the state. Inspiration is drawn from classical authors who were writing towards the end of 
the era of feudal restrictions. Adam Smith examined three markets and their conditions, 
namely those of finance, labour and land (production). He started his academic career 
delivering lectures on rhetoric, and the eloquence employed in his economic writings was 
an age-old one, that of “naturalness”.4 His panacea was to dismantle feudal restrictions 
and release economic activity to its natural state of free markets, and this emancipation 
was thought to be the obligation of the state, which had to minimise its own interference 
to a  minimum. According to the substantivist tradition, the concept of free market is 
anything but natural. It is in fact established and maintained through public authority. 
When dealing with the classical topics of finance, labour and land, Karl Polanyi sought to 
show that those markets did not arise just from dismantling feudal restrictions, but needed 
an active interference by the public sector, both to be established and to be sustained.5 This 
process has been very long indeed, spanning more or less over the whole urban history of 
Europe as Henri Pirenne and Max Weber have indicated.6
The large-scale application of competition policies in all developed economies testify to 
the need to counteract the inherently self-destructive tendencies of markets. The most 
successful market players are those in a position to manipulate supply and/or demand, and 
thereby the price level. What they do is not just to compete on equal terms with their rivals, 
3  Bannock et al. 1998, 163
4  Smith 1986 (1776)
5  Polanyi 2001 (1944)
6  Pirenne 2014 (1925); Weber 1978 (1922)
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but to gain a position where they can set the rules of the game. Monopoly describes a market 
in which there is only one supplier, who is motivated by making profits and, in addition, 
stands alone and prevents new actors from entering the market. By restricting supply, the 
market price of its output is set at the point where marginal revenue of the monopolist is 
equated with marginal cost. Prices are higher and output lower than they would be under 
competition. Oligopoly indicates a market dominated by a few large suppliers, and mimics 
monopolistic conditions in case main actors are able to make collusive agreements with 
one another. Monopsony features a market with only one buyer of the item sold, thereby 
having an impact on the market price. Land use-related production, such as housing, 
easily predicates the occurrence of natural monopoly as limited local land sources often 
preclude the efficient existence of more than one producer. As we shall see below, the 
Swedish housing regime is served by a planning legislation that enhances the chances for 
monopolies to occur. Social or public housing is often characterised by oligopolies and 
monopsony, and it can be an example of the price driving effects of exclusive and non-
rivalrous markets. 
The structure and scope of housing markets in any particular country is a historical outcome 
of its initial creation and redemption. Markets mirror the factual interests of all the main 
categories of economic agents involved. These actors include land owners, producers 
of building material, the construction industry, the development sector, the financing 
sector, sales organisations, consultants and professional organisations connected to legal 
matters, planning, design, marketing, lobbying and mediation, etc. All these categories 
are supposed to operate within the overall rules, regulations and standards of public 
authority at various geographical levels. They are also dependent on the interpretations of 
public administrators that manage land use and housing. In addition, the political system 
delivers the general framework for housing in terms of laws and regulations, political 
aims, subsidies and income transfers, property rights, etc. Due to historical reasons, the 
setup of housing regimes in various countries are very different indeed. They reflect the 
amalgamation of all the different interests involved, but they may also be a token of more 
fundamental strategies that have to be uncovered. Such strategies may involve the elite of 
the wealthiest in particular, but also the political elite of populist politics. In this respect, 
strategies can take the form of hidden agendas as well as justifications, phrased as all the 
good things in life. The Swedish housing regime seems to include elements of both.
In trying to understand the housing regime of any particular country, one has to realise 
core determinants of that country in the context of political history. Sweden is a particular 
case in Europe as it is often referred to as being an example of a corporatist society, together 
with the Netherlands and Austria.7 These countries actually have a long history of strong 
and consistent housing policies with strong emphasis on public housing. Corporatism can 
be defined as the socio-political organisation of a society by major interest groups. In the 
case of Sweden, it refers in particular to a situation where the major labour organisations, 
representing employers and employees together with representatives of the state, agree 
on issues related to labour supply, its pricing and quality. Negotiations may also relate 
to social and economic politics such as housing. Among adherents to parliamentarian 
democracy, corporatism has been criticised for being an undemocratic form of government, 
which is accentuated by the parallel to Mussolini’s Italy and Franco’s Spain where labour 
7  Held 1996, 284
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organisations applied top-down policies. The Swedish corporatism has been modified 
over the years, but it is presumably still going strong.8 
In this study, the composition of the Swedish housing market in terms of outputs is taken 
as a point of departure. The factual outcomes as to the production of new dwellings, and 
the distribution of dwelling types and housing standards, have been monitored according 
to available statistics for the post war period. To study the composition of the housing 
market, one should also include the various forms of tenure and associated property rights. 
The smaller the influence of market exchange, the more important become administrative 
and political mechanisms. 
The factual evidences of the applied housing policy have been contrasted to outspoken 
policy aims and objectives. Despite the fact that policy aims in most countries as a rule 
differ from factual outcome, this way of contrasting outspoken wishes with results is 
pertinent in the Swedish case due to the persistency of the executed policy. If policy results 
in the long run deviate from policy aims, the cause of the applied policy must be sought for 
and be explained in the structure and scope of the housing market.
Being a strongly bipolar society, any policy implementation is likely to match the interests 
of the elite to the right as well as to the left. In the case of housing, this may have been 
reached by establishing a very complex system for the redistribution of dwelling services. 
As with historical accounts in general, such explanations are not of a strictly causal nature, 
but more in the direction of making prevailing structures intelligible. Elite strategies 
are of course “elite” precisely for the reason that they are deliberate, but not necessarily 
outspoken, and therefore mainly evident on a contextual level of understanding. They 
have to be interpreted.
The research utilises statistical data of Eurostat, OECD, Statistics Sweden (SCB) and 
Statistics Finland. Statistical data concerning Swedish households´ housing costs was 
ordered from SCB and drawn from “Households´ Economy Survey 2011” (HEK), as well 
as corresponding surveys in 2004–2010. These surveys have been collected annually from 
extensive nation-wide representative samples of Swedish households. For a summary of 
the statistical compilation, please see Part B of this research report. 
8  Larsson & Bäck 2008, 73, 106–110
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1 Housing stock and tenure 
The housing stock
In the European context, Sweden is a recently urbanised country. The share of homes 
located in multi-storey buildings has since 1960 been between 50 and 60 per cent of the 
housing stock. Now the share is 56 per cent while the corresponding figure in Finland is 46 
per cent. The total number of dwellings amounted in 2013 to some 4.6 million in Sweden 
compared to 2.8 million dwellings in Finland. According to OECD statistics, available 
space per person was in Sweden 1.7 rooms and in Finland 1.9, which defies a commonly held 
notion that housing standards in Sweden would be considerably better than in Finland. 
According to Statistic Sweden (SCB), 43 per cent of the stock was located in detached 
or row houses. In Finland, the comparable share was 52 per cent (Table 1). The Swedish 
category called “particular” include student homes, dormitories, etc. 
 
Sweden
Housing stock
Number Share
%
Finland
Housing stock
Number Share
%
Detached & row houses 1 999 964 43 Detached 1 046 214 38
Multi-storey 2 332 253 50 Chain or row h. 395 562 14
Other 79 127 2 Multi-storey 1 290 215 46
Particular 222 334 3 Other 55 180 2
Total 4 633 678 100 Total 2 787 171 100
Table 1. Number and share of dwellings according to type of building in Sweden and Finland. 
Statistical Data Base 2013
An important aspect of ownership is how widespread it is. To what extent do individuals 
own homes as compared to the portion owned by institutions and companies? In case of 
Sweden, private persons own some 45 per cent of the dwelling stock.9 The corresponding 
figure for Finland would be some 80 per cent.10 In Sweden the private sector (individuals 
plus private firms) altogether own some 57 per cent of the stock, but ownership is more 
9  Statistikdata 2013.
10  Statistics on ownership is not available, only on tenure, but as the share of regulated rents is 14 per cent 
and the category ”other” is 4 per cent, a reliable estimation would be that in Finland the rest is owned by 
private individuals as privately owned rental firms are insignificant.
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concentrated than in Finland. In Sweden, home ownership concerns by definition only 
real estate, which means that in practice only detached houses and row houses are to 
be classified as ownership dwellings.11 One implication of this is that owner-occupied 
dwellings are practically non-existing in multi-storey buildings, and that ownership 
correlates with house type. Accordingly, spatial segregation is directly connected to the 
type of house where the various categories of the population live. Areas with multi-storey 
buildings consist almost entirely of rentals and cooperatives, while areas composed of 
villas and row houses are owner-occupied.12 In Sweden, the distribution of house types 
provides accordingly a good overview of tenure as well as spatial segregation. 
It is important to realise the difference between ownership and tenure in different 
countries. In Sweden, ownership and tenure are closely related as practically only villas 
and row houses are owner-occupied and thereby eligible for letting. Possessors of rentals 
as well as of cooperatives cannot legally let their dwellings further with a profit.13 In 
Finland, home ownership is not restricted according to building type and condominiums 
in multi-storey buildings can by their owners be used for letting to market price. Therefore 
different tenures are spatially mixed and the status of any particular area is not determined 
by prevailing building types, but according to the blend of its inhabitants. 
Tenure
The share of owner-occupied housing in Sweden has been stable (36–42 per cent) during 
the post war period (1945–2012). There has been a big increase in cooperatives, from 4 per 
cent in 1945 to 20 in 2012. During the same period, rentals have decreased from 57 to 
43 per cent. In Finland, the share of rentals has dropped as well, being however on a lower 
level than in Sweden during the whole period.
A feature of the tenure structure in Sweden is the high share of rentals and cooperatives. 
The figures below (Table 2.) indicate the factual distribution of tenure among households 
in 2012. Rentals (hyresrätt) made up 40 per cent of the housing stock. The share of 
cooperatives (boenderätt) was 20 per cent and of owner-occupied (äganderätt) 37 per 
cent. The remaining 3 per cent was classified as “other”, which were probably mostly 
rentals.14  As stated above, owner-occupied housing means detached and row-houses as 
this is the only tenure category implying full property rights, including the unrestricted 
right to let the whole property for rent. The share of owner-occupied dwellings is smaller 
11  Since 2009 it is possible to have apartments in multi-storey buildings classified as owner-occupied in 
case the apartment is made a property by charted survey and listed in the cadastre. The share of such dwell-
ings is negligible, i.e. some 0.01 per cent of the housing stock.
12  The share of rentals and cooperatives located in villas and row houses are 5.5 per cent and 7.8 per cent 
respectively out of the total housing stock located in in this type of small buildings. Their share of the total 
housing stock is some 4 per cent
13  Letting is strictly regulated and limited in time. Rents are supposed to be non-profitable and have to 
correspond to the rent paid by the initial possessor or, in case of cooperatives, match the monthly pay of the 
initial possessor.
14  The figures are according to a survey called Households’ Economy, which is carried out on a regular basis 
and reflects the factual distribution of tenure across the whole housing stock. According to Housing Stock 
Statistics, the corresponding figures are slightly different (owners 41, cooperatives 23, rentals 36) due to the 
fact that tenure is defined according to ownership, not according to the factual status among dwellers.
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than the share of villas and row houses would indicate, because part of these are rentals (2 
per cent) or cooperatives (1.8 per cent). 
The peculiarities of Swedish housing become apparent when compared with the Finnish 
case. The share of households owning a house in Sweden (37 %) corresponds to the situation 
in Finland (36 %). In Finland, 30 % of households own the apartment (condominiums) 
where they live, and, in addition, may own additional apartments used as second homes 
or being let for rent. Consequently, the share of owner-occupied housing in Finland is 
considerably higher than that in Sweden.
Tenure status Sweden, % Finland, %
Owns the house 37 36
Owns the apartment  30
Co-operative flat 20  
Rental, regulated price 40 14
Rental, market price  16
Other / unknown 3 4
Total 100 100
Table 2. Households by tenure status in Sweden (2012) and in Finland (2011)
Most cooperatives are flats in multi-storey buildings, and cooperative housing is indeed 
a Swedish characteristic. Its historical roots are affiliated with the cooperative movement 
and labour unions. The cooperative sector is very centralised and large-scale indeed. For 
instance HSB (Hyresgästernas sparkasse- och byggnadsförening), which has got 445 000 
members residing in cooperative dwellings (in addition to some 100 000 members taking 
part in saving programmes). These are organised in 31 regional HSB-associations and in 
some 3  900 local cooperatives. The two federative levels provide the local cooperatives 
with a range of services. A similar organisation is Riksbyggen, including some 1 600 
local cooperatives, 33 interest alliances and 24 regional associations.15 Management 
executed by the federative level of the cooperative sector is indirect but very influential, 
and it concerns administration and maintenance services as well as refurbishment and 
development issues. 
Trading cooperative apartments is nowadays unrestricted, but letting them is only 
exceptionally allowed for a limited period of time and the rent is regulated to match the 
regular monthly charge for the particular dwelling being rented.16 As a rule, cooperative 
dwellings can be used only by the possessor of the dwelling, and, lacking full property 
rights, they cannot be considered to match the common criteria of ownership, that is, to 
be utilised for profitable use. In international statistics, Swedish cooperative housing has 
been classified inconsistently. For example The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) categorizes cooperatives as rental housing whereas Eurostat Statistics 
of Income and Living Condition (SILC) categorize them as owner-occupied housing. 
15  http://www.hsb-historien.se/snabbfakta/; https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSB;  https://sv.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Riksbyggen; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TglIz8JURig;  http://www.riksbyggen.se/Om-Riksby-
ggen/Organisation/Vara-agare/# 
16  Boverket 2014, Hyresnämnden 2014
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In Sweden, public housing is not considered to be “social”, because eligibility is not based 
on socio-economic criteria, but in practice the residential composition in public housing 
features socioeconomic and ethnic segmentation as will be further discussed below.17 
Public rental housing and private rental housing make up approximately equal shares of 
the total rental stock in Sweden. The private part is owned by rental companies, not by 
individuals. Consequently, the ownership of rentals is very concentrated as well. 
Swedish rental housing has misleadingly been classified in international statistics. 
Eurostat-SILC categorises the whole Swedish rental sector as “rent at market price” 
when in fact there is hardly any such thing as market rents in multi-storey buildings in 
the whole country! The tenet of Swedish housing as a citizens’ right, secured by public 
institutions, has in practice meant that extensive property rights cover less than 40 per 
cent of the total housing stock, consisting mostly of the owner-occupied homes. All rents 
are centrally negotiated above the head of single tenants and public housing has been seen 
as an important means in the pursuit of affordable housing.18  It is, however, questionable 
as to what extent rent regulation has restricted rent rises. The effects of rent regulation 
may be the opposite, which will be discussed below in greater detail.  
The restrictions to accrue legal profits on housing have boosted the rental black market in 
growth centres in particular.19 The ban on letting rentals and cooperatives for second or 
third hand renting has caused illegal rents to surge and it has created an illegal submarket, 
exempted from taxation. The phenomenon has been little studied. Another mode of 
realising potential profits has been to convert municipally owned rental properties into 
cooperatives, and to get hold of the value increase by selling one’s cooperative share to 
prices that by far exceed their nominal values as defined at the time of conversion.20 The 
transformation of rentals to cooperatives is particularly profitable in central locations, 
where policy makers often reside. The phenomenon of turning rentals into cooperatives 
has been extensive. During the period from 2000 to 2012, some 160  000 rentals were 
transferred into cooperatives in Sweden. More than two thirds of these transformations 
were made in the Stockholm region. 
Rental housing is considerably smaller in Finland (30 per cent) than in Sweden (here 
estimated to a total of 43 per cent). Contrary to Sweden, the rental sector in Finland is 
divided into a regulated and an unregulated sector. Social housing with regulated rents 
and tenant selection is allocated according to income, wealth and need. The rents of the 
private sector are market based. In contrast to Sweden, private rental apartments are 
mostly owned by individual households, not by rental companies. These two sectors make 
up approximately equal shares of the rental housing stock. Also in Finland, the regulated 
sector seems to have a price-driving effect on the unregulated sector due to rent increase 
regardless business cycle.21
17  Large units of public housing have been a significant factor in strengthening ethnic and socio-economic 
segregation. Andersson et al. 2010, 31–32.
18  Andersson & Magnusson Turner 2014; Christophers 2013, 898
19  Boverket 2011 Mörtlund, 2013, SOU 2007
20  A social democratic minister of housing had to leave office after she had criticised these kinds of actions 
in her public appearances while making a neat fortune by doing it herself. See Aftonbladet 13.1.2007
21 Bengs 1989
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2 Production and reduction
Production
The post war production of dwellings in Sweden reflected the endeavour to establish a new 
kind of housing market. According to decisions made in the late 1940s, provision of housing 
(bostadsförsörjningen) became a municipal liability. The cabinet decided annually on the 
nationwide number of dwellings to be produced, and how to distribute the target number 
across the municipalities as well.  The municipal housing programmes were designed 
according to the national quota and building permits were distributed among selected 
developers. Already in the 1960s, competition among developers was considered to be 
restricted by the way building land was allocated.22 The municipal rental companies were 
promoted and the share of public rentals was on average some 40 per cent. The cooperative 
sector was offered about one third and the private sector one fourth of the quota. 
The planning legislation (PBL) of 1987 secured the prerogatives of the development 
sector by explicitly denying municipalities to generate land banks with property rights, 
which was accomplished by requiring land use plans (detaljplan) always to be based on 
designated developers and prospective building projects. As a rule, most municipalities 
do not possess the capacity to deal with a big number of small developers, and therefore 
the big players have got the upper hand in this planning regime.23 The practice has caused 
a constant deficit of building land for other than favoured developers, and firmly placed 
housing provision into the hands of the biggest producers. 
The period from 1950 to the mid-70s was featured by extensive production of multi-storey 
buildings, which in the Swedish case meant rentals and cooperatives (Figure 1). A peak 
was reached around 1970 when some 110  000 homes were produced. This reflected the 
policy aim of producing one million new dwellings during a ten year period from 1965 
to 1974 (“The Million Programme”). In addition to the selected allocation of production 
quota, the concentration of housing production into a fewer hands was promoted during 
this period by the way state funding was designed. Since 1966, projects of more than 1 000 
dwellings were promoted, which constituted a major part of the Million Programme. This 
mode of funding was justified by the alleged advantage of large scale production. Surely, 
22  Samordning 1967
23  Bengs 2010a; Bengs 2010b
16 The housing regime of Sweden: Concurrent challenges
production costs were reduced, but the lack of market mechanisms did not necessarily 
transform reduced production costs into lower consumer prices. One effect of the applied 
policy was that big developers and producers got the lion share of the new production – to 
the detriment of the traditional small-scale developers (byggmästare). 
Figure 1: Housing production in Sweden according to house type, GDP changes in real terms, 
1950–2013 (SCB 1960, SCB 1970, SCB 1980, OECD 2014)
The funding arrangements were supported by the effort to unify construction technology 
and design by standardisation, which integrated big producers in particular. The preference 
for all-inclusive development contracts served the same purpose and was promoted by 
both the political right and left.24 The all-inclusive development contracts concentrated 
development into the hands of the main contractor by subduing other contractors, 
which also reduced commissioners’ possibility to overview price formation. A number of 
additional services such as project design and land use planning were included into all-
inclusive contracts as well. The share of all-inclusive contracts was 15 per cent in 1966, but 
40 per cent in the early 1970s.25
A peculiar feature of Swedish housing was the division of the market into two big 
blocks, the public rental and cooperative sector controlled and promoted by the social 
democrats on the one hand, and the private sector promoted by the political right on the 
other hand. Building producers owned by the Swedish building workers’ union occurred 
already in the 1920s and they expanded successively. The single enterprises were fused 
into a  national company called BPA Byggproduktion AB, which continued to expand by 
buying up construction companies. The trade union had expanded as a developer (Svenska 
Riksbyggen) of public rentals and housing cooperatives as well. In 1967, the cooperation 
24  Waldén 1971
25  Grange 2005; Eriksson 1994
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between Riksbyggen and BPA was intensified in order for BPA to take part in bidding 
for all-inclusive building contracts. BPA grew rapidly and at its heyday it was the biggest 
housing producer and the second biggest construction company in the country. Its success 
was secured by the national cabinet’s housing policy as well as by benevolent political 
support in metropolitan regions in particular. 
The obvious restrictions to competition were pointed out in a commission report of the 
early 1970s and Riksbyggen were accused of enjoying unfair competition by the fact that its 
employees were decision-makers in municipal rental companies and voted for contracts 
in the favour of Riksbyggen, their own employer. The company replied that this showed 
the company’s particular commitment towards the rental companies.26 On the national 
level, the network building is indicated by the then-chairman of the construction workers’ 
trade union who was at one time a MP as well as chairman of both Riksbyggen and BPA. 
In his vision, the country could do well with two blocks only, the private sector for private 
housing and the trade union-controlled block for rentals and cooperatives. Competition 
was supposed to emerge between the blocks, not between single companies. 
The promotion of large-scale production resulted in a unique vertical and horizontal 
concentration of the private sector and in the 1980s Sweden had the most concentrated 
construction industry in the OECD group, Finland being number two on the list.27 In 1988, 
the 12 biggest construction companies in Sweden had a 70 per cent market share. In the 
1990s during the recession, the biggest Swedish construction firms acquired the biggest 
Finnish firms, and since then only three firms (Skanska, NCC and PEAB) are supposed to 
run the main bulk of the business. Middle-size construction companies are not to be found 
in abundance, and a whole host of small subcontractors has occurred. This is accompanied 
by a strong concentration of material producers, who joined the construction market from 
the start of the Million Programme. Initially Skanska actually started off as a cement 
producer (Skånska Cement AB in 1871).
As the housing market got saturated, production decreased to one third in the mid-80s, 
then soared during the boom of the late 80s and early 90s, plunged again in the 90s and 
staying after that on a comparatively low level of 15 000 to 30 000 homes per year. The 
production of detached and row houses has followed the overall trend. Assisted by their 
extraordinary capability to prey on the Swedish housing regime, the biggest housing 
producers have long since gone international.
In Finland, the pattern of housing production is the same, except for a delay in the initial 
phase due to even later urbanisation than in Sweden. From the early 1970s on, the 
production of new dwellings as compared to population, has been bigger in Finland than in 
Sweden. Except for the 1970s, the share of production located in multi-storey buildings has 
been bigger in Sweden than in Finland. A comparison with the two countries is interesting 
in the respect that in both countries the effect of housing has been an extraordinary 
concentration of the building sector despite the large differences in applied housing 
policies. This seems to be a matter that reinforces the need to penetrate the surface of 
employed policies in order to grasp prevailing economic interests lingering behind. 
26  Gråbacke 2002, 112, footnote
27  Pajakkala & Niemi 1987
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Reduction
When the housing stock is reduced, it stimulates surplus demand and eventually causes 
house prices to rise. Managing the existing building stock is thus not only an issue for 
heritage protection, but a matter that affects the preconditions for new production and 
the founding of a new housing market. Despite its importance, statistical evidence of 
reductions in the housing stock in Sweden is incomplete. The number of dwellings has 
decreased mainly due to abandonment and to demolition. Only the demolition of homes 
in multi-storey buildings has been followed up, since 1989 in a systematic manner. 
Demolition increased steadily from c. 1950 to c. 1970, when it reached its peak, and then 
dropped steadily till the mid-90s. During the period 1959–1975, a total of 125 000 homes 
were lost. After a rapid growth during the late 90s and early 2000s, it has stabilised on 
a comparatively low level (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Demolished dwellings in multi-storey buildings in Sweden 1949–2013. SCB 2014f, 
SCB 1991
Dwellings were reduced not only by demolishing or abandoning, but by fusing smaller 
homes into bigger ones, by transforming them to work space or to weekend homes and 
holiday resorts. The total amount of deleted homes is considerable. From 1960 to 2013, 
some 31 per cent of the housing stock in multi-story buildings (434 000 flats) in 1960, and 
33 per cent of dwellings in villas and row houses (413 000 homes), have disappeared. This 
means that approximately one third of all dwellings of the housing stock in 1960 has been 
lost till present. 
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During the initial phase of the period, demolition concerned the central areas of historical 
town centres in particular. During one decade, during the 1960s, 42 per cent of the housing 
stock located in buildings, built before 1901, were demolished. In some towns, 80 per cent 
of the old stock disappeared. From 1960 to 1975, the overall figure for 19 historical town 
centres was a 56 per cent demolition of housing in old buildings (Figure 3). The columns of 
the figure indicate number of deleted homes, and the red dots their share of the historical 
housing stock.
Figure 3: The demolition (1960-75) of houses situated in buildings built before 1901 in 9 towns. 
Johansson 1997.
The reasons given for the demolition of the historical town centres was to get building 
land in central locations for new rentals as well as getting new department stores by the 
historical town squares.28 
The demolition of the historical town centres was actually prepared for already in the 
early post war period. A major policy document of 1945 pursued the target to demolish 
140  000 small dwellings in old buildings.29 Those dwellings were the cheapest available 
on the market, and their liquidation meant a lift for new production: supply was decreased 
and the demand for new dwellings increased. Another preparatory measure of the same 
period was to make it legally feasible to demolish whole districts in historical town 
centres without having to present any concrete plan for the future.30 This was promoted 
28  The new department stores were as a rule two in number, one for cooperative sector and one for the 
private sector, mimicking the political bipolarity in Swedish post war politics. Johansson 1997
29  SOU 1945
30  Johansson 1997
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as “sanitation ideology” in order to get valuable land for the purpose of building rental 
dwellings in central locations.31 
After the big building boom ended in the mid-70s, the targets of demolition have changed. 
Concurrently, a major target are the rentals built in the 60s and 70s. There is a  strong 
correlation between population trends and demolition of dwellings in multi-story 
buildings.32 In regions with shrinking population, rentals are left empty and it is often 
considered to be less costly to demolish them than to maintain the derelict buildings. Now, 
available statistics also provide information on the reason for demolition, and the major 
reason during the last 16 years has been vacancy of rental dwellings.33 
31  Gråbacke 2002
32  Part B, 30
33  Part B, 29
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3 Economy of housing 
Rents
In real terms, the average rents in Sweden doubled from 1969 to 2013 (Figure 4). Making a 
modest assumption about a productivity increase in housing of 1 per cent per year during 
the period, the average rent should have dropped to some 65 per cent of its initial value. 
Accordingly, the rent in real terms was in fact at the end of the period at least three times 
higher than it ought to have been compared to the economic development at large. This 
indicates that the effects of increased productivity did not have an impact on the rental 
level in Sweden. On the pretext of extensive urbanisation and the changing residential 
pattern, rents are supposed to rise by necessity. In regions where there has been a rapid 
population growth, the land prices have surged. This is, however, not a reliable explanation 
to the overall increase in the public sector, as land banks of the public rental companies 
were mostly allocated already before the period of soaring land values. In addition, land 
has not been levied according to its factual value increase. The rise of rent has to be 
explained in some other way, namely in terms of market analyses. Market corruption, is 
always inherent in land use: the bigger the land banks of developers, the more restricted 
is competition in housing and the less do improvements in productivity penetrate factual 
sales prices and rents.  
Figure 4. Average rents (SEK/m2/year) 1969-2013 in real terms (2013). SCB 2014d
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When considering the change of rent in real terms for each year (1970–2013) compared 
to the previous year, one realises that for most years the average rent has been growing 
(Figure 5). During the 44 years under consideration, real rent growth occurred 35 times. 
In the early 90s during the recession, the rise in real rents was dramatic. In 1991 the rise in 
real terms was for instance 15 per cent and the next year it was 6 per cent. During the whole 
period, rent decrease occurred only in the case of 9 individual years, and in no case was 
it bigger than 2 per cent. This indicates that recessions and slumps did not have a price-
reducing effect on rents, but rather the contrary. As the rents are stipulated for each year 
according to central agreements, the most valid explanation to the long term rise in rents 
seems to be the regulation itself. The rental level regulated by administrative/political 
decisions allowed for persistent rises year after year, regardless the economic situation of 
successive slumps or booms. As slumps seem to have initiated the highest rent increases in 
real terms, it indicates a mechanism contrary to the way open markets normally operate. 
Figure 5. Change in average rents in Sweden 1970-2013 as compared to the previous year in %.
As rent regulation covers the rents of publicly as well as privately owned companies, the 
rents of these two categories follow the same pattern. From 2003 to 2013 the variations 
were almost identical, but the rents of the private companies were constantly on a slightly 
higher (6 per cent on average) level. This is explained by the fact that till 2011, the 
regulation of the rents of private companies was modelled according to the rents of the 
public companies. Since 2011, rents are allegedly set according to the factual value of the 
housing stock regardless ownership, which implies the use of pre-set standards for pricing. 
As the privately owned stock of rentals has not been subjected to the influence of open 
markets, but mimicked the publicly owned sector, it seems likely that the public sector 
rentals have been the core factor causing the long-term rent rise in Sweden. This 
assessment is strengthened by comparison to Finland, where 16 per cent of the entire 
housing stock consists of unregulated rentals and only 14 per cent of regulated rentals. 
From 1969 to 2013, the rent in real terms increased in Finland only 39 per cent, which is 
a considerably lower figure than that in Sweden (100 per cent) during the corresponding 
period. In Finland, the effect of the more volatile unregulated rentals caused a situation 
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where the rental level in real terms was decreasing in the case of 15 out of totally 45 years 
(1970–2013). Also in Finland, public housing obviously has got a rise driving effect in the 
long run, but it has been more modest than in Sweden, presumably due to the existence of 
a free market rental sector that curbs the price rise of regulated rents.34 During the last ten 
years of economic hardship, the public sector rents have increased more than the private 
sector rents.35
House prices
The house prices (detached and row houses) in Sweden reflect market conditions as these 
houses are associated with full property rights. The price level of the other modes of tenure 
(rentals, cooperatives) may affect the overall price level of owner-occupied dwellings, but 
not necessarily the fluctuations of prices within that market. Markets modify house prices 
in two ways. On the one hand, the effects of the business cycle are obvious as prices in real 
terms soar during booms and plunge during slumps. During 32 years (1982–2013), the 
average house price in real terms was negative for 10 years and the maximum drop (14 per 
cent) in 1992 was actually bigger than any rise during the period. On the other hand, the 
spatial repercussions are obvious as well. During the boom of the late 80s, prices diverted 
as the price level of growing regions soared because of expanding demand. Diversion 
decreased during the recession of the early 90s and then again increased towards the end 
of that decade. 
During the period 1981–2013, the rise of the average house price was 142 per cent in 
nominal terms. 
Prices of cooperatives
The average price rise of cooperatives has been very rapid. During a 10 years period (2003-
2013) the price rise was 138 in nominal terms, being more rapid than the price rise of owner-
occupied dwellings during the same period. As the growth of the number of cooperatives 
has been particularly strong in the biggest metropolitan regions of the country, the price 
rise may also indicate growing effective demand – despite curbed property rights of this 
mode of tenure. As much of the supply is new production, the price level may also reflect 
the operations of a handful of oligopolies in the metropolitan regions. Only in 2008 did 
prices turn negative in real terms. 
Housing costs
International comparisons usually point to a fairly strong correlation between the share of 
rentals and the level of housing costs in any given country: the higher the share of rentals, 
the higher housing costs (Figure 6). This fact defies a widespread notion of “affordable” 
as being synonymous with rental housing. In the light of comparable statistics it may be 
the other way around. Lower average housing costs would require an increase in owner-
34  The long-term price-rising effect of Finnish rent regulation is evident from statistics. Bengs 1989
35  Part B, 41
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occupation. Low income groups are, however, often out of reach of home ownership 
funding, and they are forced to cling to rentals and hope for cheap rent to occur and 
degraded environments to be upgraded. At the global arena, the deprived are subjected to 
the same logic with regard to food and nutrition as well as security and other everyday 
services, which cost them more than wealthier must pay for the same services.
Figure 6. The share of rental dwellings (%) and the share of housing cost (net housing cost, %  
of disposable income) in low-income households 2011, EU-countries, Sweden in red. Reijo 2013, 
Eurofound 2012
In Sweden, the average housing costs are 21.8 per cent of available household income for 
the whole population, and for the low income group it is as high as 45.8 per cent.36 The 
corresponding figures for Finland are 17.5 and 33.4 per cent, and for the EU average 22.5 
and 41.2. This means that for the low income group, housing costs in Sweden are higher 
than the EU average and it ranks among the highest in EU-27.37 It is worth noting the 
high costs for the low income group despite the fact that Sweden maintains an image of 
egalitarianism. 
The different housing costs, dependent on tenure, are in no way extreme. In absolute 
figures, housing costs are highest among home owners while households living in rentals 
pay 93 per cent as compared to average owner-occupiers, and those in cooperatives 91 
per cent. The differences in absolute figures are thus fairly small. When considering the 
composition of households, one-person households living in rentals pay more in nominal 
terms than those of other tenure groups. For instance aged single men (65+) pay some 30 
per cent more in absolute figures than corresponding owner-occupiers.
If we look at housing costs in relation to available income across the three tenure groups, 
the picture changes radically, and actually provides an explanation to the high costs for 
housing of low income groups. The income levels are different across the tenure modes, 
36  The low income group stands for the share of people whose income falls below the poverty line (half the 
median household income of the total population).
37  Part B, 53
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indicating a phenomenon called segmentation. The average yearly income of households 
living in cooperatives exceeds that of those living in rentals by 39 per cent. The income 
of owner-occupiers exceed that of rentals by 111 per cent. This means of course that the 
differences in housing costs are very big indeed when related to available income. On 
average, households living in rentals pay 28 per cent of their available income for housing. 
In the cooperative sector the corresponding figure is 19 and among owners only 14 per 
cent. When the tenure groups are differentiated according to household categories, the 
variations are still bigger. For instance aged, single women (65+) living in rentals, pay 
on average more than 40 per cent of their available income for their dwelling. When 
considering room for consumption according to tenure and household category, the 
picture gets even more diverse. The lowest level of available spending is found among 
single, aged women.
The rent rise (1980–2010) in Sweden has been more than twice as big as that of the 
consumer cost index while home owners’ costs have been below that index (Figure 7). 
A  valid explanation may be that the housing costs according to tenure seem to reflect 
the degree of market influence within the three modes of tenure. The regulated rental 
sector has simply been rather unaffected by market mechanisms. The price rise of rentals 
may be explained by their central locations compared to owner-occupied dwellings, and 
that they are in big demand due to extensive immigration. At the same time there have, 
however, occurred strong converse tendencies such as the social and sometimes physical 
degradation of rental areas relative to other kinds of neighbourhoods, which lowers 
the demand for rentals and should have a price-curbing effect. Concurrent consumer 
preferences, which favour cooperatives and owner-occupation, may have the same effect.
Figure 7. Sweden, consumer price index and housing expenditures by tenure type 1980=100.  
SCB, yearbook
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Wealth, indebtedness and poverty rate
Economic inequality is the difference in how assets, wealth, or income are distributed 
across populations. It is measured as the gap between rich and poor or income inequality, 
wealth disparity, wealth and income differences, or the wealth gap. According to a scale 
of 6 categories, the distribution of income links Sweden (GINI-coefficient 0.30) with 
the second most equal group of countries, together with Finland (0.29) and nine other 
countries.38 Despite the comparatively even distribution of income in Sweden, it is less 
equal than Finland, Denmark and Norway (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Income inequality, 2011. OECD
Income is different from wealth.39 They are related in the sense that for average households, 
surplus income is normally accumulated into wealth. Consequently, it is commonly 
thought that countries with an egalitarian distribution of income would feature a similar 
distribution of wealth. This is not always the case, however, and Sweden is in fact an 
exception to this rule. The GINI-coefficient of wealth distribution is a testimony of this. 
In the 2000s, Sweden was one of the countries with the most unequal wealth distribution 
in the entire world (6th in global rank in 2010) with a GINI-coefficient of 0.85 (Table 
3). For the sake of comparison, the corresponding figure that year for the USA was 0.81 
and for Finland 0.58, which was the second lowest in Europe at the time. In the case of 
Sweden, there seems to have been a reduction of inequality while the trend is the opposite 
38  The GINI-coefficient indicates the pattern of equal distribution. Value close to 1.0 would indicate totally 
unequal distribution, value close to 0.0 would indicate totally equal distribution. The most equal group en-
compasses 6 European countries (the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Norway, Czech Republic and Slovenia 
as the most equal). Therborn 2013, 131–138
39  Picketty 2014
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in Finland. As wealth distribution is a phenomenon of considerable stability, save wars 
etc., it is probable that the swings in the figures below are an effect of unreliable or missing 
data, or swings in currency rates. One explanation to the changing figures on Sweden may 
be a recent lack of data as taxation of wealth was abolished in 2007. Taxation used to be the 
main source of information with regard to wealth and its distribution.40 
 2010 2012 2013 2014
Sweden  0.85  0.81  0.80  0.79
Finland  0.58  0.66  0.66  0.71
Table 3. Wealth distribution in Sweden and Finland 2010–2014, GINI-coefficient. Credit Suissa 
Research Institute, Global Wealth Databook 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014)
The assumption of unequal wealth distribution is in Sweden supported by a number of 
research reports on national conditions.41 According to Credit Suisse, the wealthiest 
1 per cent of the population possessed 24 per cent of the total wealth of the country.42 
If the ownership of family-owned companies and investments overseas are included, 
the wealthiest 1 per cent of the population was actually supposed to possess more than 
40 percent of the total sum of wealth, which is an amazingly high share.43 Despite the 
uncertainty of available information, it is sufficiently safe to assume that fairly equal 
income distribution in combination with very unequal wealth distribution is a peculiar 
characteristic of the Swedish society. This matter should obviously be taken into 
consideration when trying to interpret the Swedish housing regime and the possibilities 
for households to accumulate wealth. 
The composition of wealth in Sweden may provide a picture of the effects of (and reasons 
for) the pursued housing policy. Here, Finland is taken as a point of reference. In both 
countries, the accumulation of household wealth is mainly to be found in real estate and 
property such as regular dwelling, second home, investment dwellings and land. Wealth is 
also composed of financial assets such as deposits, shares and bonds. 
When considering the total amount of wealth per capita, the situation is almost equal 
in Sweden and Finland.44 When considering indebtedness, the picture changes as 
indebtedness per capita in Sweden is 47 per cent higher than that in Finland. In Sweden, 
the indebtedness constitutes 28 per cent of the total wealth per capita, in Finland the 
corresponding figure is 19 per cent. 
When regarding the composition of wealth in Sweden and Finland, a clear difference is 
the share of property versus financial assets. In Sweden, 72 per cent of the wealth is in the 
form of property and 28 per cent in financial assets. The corresponding figures in Finland 
are 81 and 19 per cent. One explanation is to be found in housing policy. In Sweden, 
40  In Finland, taxation of wealth has been abolished as well, but the outcome concerning reliable data may 
be different compared to Sweden as company-structure is different, and owners live overseas is smaller in 
Finland than in Sweden.
41  Roine & Waldenström 2007; Roine & Walderström 2008;  Waldenström 2010 
42  Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2013. The corresponding figure for the USA was 34 per cent.
43  Waldenström 2010
44  Part B, 58
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dwelling is hardly a lucrative investment due to prevailing rules. Such restrictions are not 
present in Finland, and therefore one tenth of the household wealth is directly deployed 
in investments in speculative housing. Swedes are left with the possibilities offered by 
the financial market and therefore their investments in financial assets exceed those of 
Finland.
The indebtedness (share of yearly income) of Swedish households has grown from 40 per 
cent in 2001 to 125 in 2010. Loans for housing constituted the lion part of the debts. In 
2010, housing debts constituted a sum that corresponded to 80 per cent of the GDP. This 
was the fifth highest figure in Europe, only next to The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland 
and UK. One reason for the indebtedness is the prevailing policy among Swedish financial 
institutions, which provides a zero-amortisation scheme for housing loans. In 2011, 
Sweden had the highest rate (66 per cent) of people living in households with house loans 
among all OECD countries and the lowest share of not-indebted households (4 per cent).45
Inequality in terms of wealth fosters polarisation of the extremes. In Sweden, the 
concentration of wealth presupposes poverty, which is defined as the ratio of the number of 
people in a given group whose income falls below the poverty line, equalling half the median 
household income of the total population. Thus two countries with the same poverty rate 
may differ in real terms with regard to the income-level of the poor. As to poverty, Sweden 
is close to the European average while the rest of the Nordic countries are characterised by 
some of the lowest poverty rates – and less concentrated wealth (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Poverty rate. Total, per cent in same age group, 2011. OECD
45  Part B, 61–62
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In Sweden, public spending for social purposes is on a high level, but a bit lower than 
in Denmark and Finland (Figure 10).46 The higher level of unemployment spending in 
Denmark (2.2 per cent of GDP) and Finland (1.7. per cent) explains to a great part the 
differences to Sweden, which spends only 0.4 per cent of GDP on unemployment. The high 
social spending of Sweden can be taken as an indicator of a society in need of large income 
transfers in order to keep poverty on an acceptable level. This could also be expressed 
differently: Sweden is obviously featured by a comparatively strong structural inequality 
as a decent poverty level requires extensive public social spending. Alleged inadequacy of 
the public sector in Sweden may of course also be an explaining factor. 
Figure 10. Social spending. Public, per cent of GDP, 2014. OECD
46  Social protection is a measure of the extent to which countries assume responsibility for supporting the 
standard of living of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. Benefits may be targeted at low-income households, 
the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons. To be considered “social”, programmes have to 
involve either redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation. Social expenditure 
comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. 
Social benefits are classified as public when general government (that is central state and local governments, 
including social security funds) controls the relevant financial flows.
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4 Spatial segregation
The existence of distinct population categories and their unequal spatial distribution 
is a sufficient condition for spatial segregation.47 These requirements are necessary to 
consider when studying the mechanisms of spatial segregation. In order to be able to 
categorise the population in a way that is relevant for studying their spatial distribution, 
we have to investigate the correlation between tenure forms in housing and the population 
setup. Segmentation occurs when distinct population categories are unequally distributed 
across tenure forms. From the point of view of spatial segregation, segmentation is not an 
issue in case the various tenure forms are spread evenly across the area under scrutiny. 
It is segmentation according to tenure in combination with uneven spatial distribution of 
tenure that results in spatial segregation.
     
Figure 11. Interaction between social and spatial differentiation
As was made clear in the previous chapter, relative housing costs in Sweden vary 
for different categories of households and modes of tender. A main factor producing 
segmentation of the population across different tenures is the variation of economic 
means across various kinds of households. Age, gender and household composition are 
important factors. Another matter to consider is to what extent ethnicity in terms of 
appearance and/or habits and cultural codes result in self-induced spatial segregation, 
or alternatively, cause segregation by attitudes and actions manifest in the majority 
population. In the case of Sweden, it has been suggested that one cause of segregation is 
racialization. This conclusion is derived from the empirical observation that the more 
immigrants look like ethnic Swedes, the more likely they are to live in the same living 
quarters or neighbourhoods as the ethnic Swedes.48 
47  The composition of the population of any delineated area (nation, region or locality) can be compared 
with the composition of the population within parts of that area. The concept of spatial segregation thus indi-
cates two matters, (1) that we categorise people and that (2) the areal distribution of chosen categories differs 
from what is would be according to referred average.
48  Molina 1997
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Immigrants according to tenure
In 2013, more than 1.5 million people, or 16 per cent of the population in Sweden, were 
born abroad. In addition, 5 per cent were born in Sweden by parents born abroad, and 
still 7 per cent had one parent who was born abroad. This mean 72 per cent of the total 
population were born in Sweden by parents born in Sweden as well.49 The distribution 
of the various population groups according to tenure shows that those living in owner-
occupied dwellings counted 56 per cent out of the population born in Sweden. For people 
coming from other Nordic countries the figure was 45 per cent, for people from EU/Efta 
37 per cent and for people from other countries 19 per cent. With regards to rentals the 
situation is reverse: 26, 29, 40 and 61 per cent respectively. These figures indicate a strong 
tenure segmentation based on country of origin, which of course indicates variations in 
assets such as economic means as well as social and cultural capital. 
Over time, the range of choices seems to increase, which may indicate improved 
economical means and other assets for immigrants over time. The share of people living in 
rentals among the newly arrived (less than 2 years) is 65 per cent while dropping to 43 per 
cent for those who have lived in the country for more than 10 years. In analogy, the share of 
owner-occupiers rose from 17 to 33 per cent during the same time span.50
Compared to the situation in the capital regions of four Nordic countries, segmentation 
according to index of dissimilarity by tenure is in Stockholm actually the lowest (20) for all 
immigrants while Helsinki represents the highest score (34). The corresponding figures 
for non-western immigrants is for Stockholm 32 and for Helsinki 42. For non-westerns 
Oslo scored still lower than Stockholm (30).51
Segregation in the capital regions
When comprehending segregation, indicating spatial distribution of inequality, the 
situation in four Nordic capital regions seems different. Spatial distribution of tenures 
across neighbourhoods was studied in terms of deviation from city average (per cent: above 
or below). It turned out that the position of Stockholm (21 per cent) was the second most 
unequal, second only to Copenhagen (33), while Helsinki had the greatest mix of tenures 
(-40). When viewed in the light of the dissimilarity index, Stockholm turned out to be the 
most segregated region both for all immigrants (0.33) and for non-Europeans (0.48).  In 
Helsinki the corresponding figures (0.21 and 0.27) were considerably lower despite higher 
tenure segmentation. The high dissimilarity ratio of Stockholm for non-Europeans may 
be considered a confirmation of the existence of mechanisms that inforce racialization. 
The dissimilarity index in the county of Stockholm varies considerably according to the 
nationality of immigrants. Within the intra-European group, the dissimilarity index 
varies from 0.16 (Norwegians) to 0.37 (Russians). Among non-Europeans the variation is 
from 0.42 (Iranians) to 0.78 (Somalians).52 This may be taken as a further confirmation 
49  Part B, 66
50  Part B, 67
51  Skifter Andersen et al., 2013
52  Ibid.
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of racialisation, but contingently also as an indication of the economic dissimilarities 
between different immigrant groups. 
In the regions of both Stockholm and Helsinki, the overall share of rentals was almost 
the same (44 and 47 per cent). If two thirds or more of a district’s dwellings are rentals, 
the district could be labelled primarily rental. In Stockholm, 29 per cent of all rentals are 
located in primarily rental districts, in Helsinki, the corresponding share is only 7 per 
cent.53 Despite the relatively low rate of segmentation across the different tenures, the 
strong concentration of tenures in the region of Stockholm reduced the spatial mix of 
tenures – for the non-European population in particular. This is in stark contrast to the 
situation in Helsinki where an active policy of tenure blending has smoothed an originally 
high level of segmentation, which indicates the importance of urban policy and urban 
planning in mitigating segregation.
Spatial segregation in Sweden has from time to time been explained as an effect of 
voluminous immigration.54 It is thought that the sheer size of immigration by necessity 
causes spatial segregation. In Europe, Sweden is however not unique in receiving high 
numbers of immigrants. In the Netherlands, the share of foreign-born inhabitants is 11 per 
cent, and, in absolute terms, the immigrants are more numerous in the Netherlands than 
in Sweden. Despite the high share of immigrants in the Netherlands, spatial segregation 
is in fact shrinking, not growing, which may indicate the power of political will and 
resoluteness. The Netherland case shows that spatial segregation can be addressed despite 
a big inflow of immigrants. 
All the different modes of tenure may in their own ways contribute to spatial segregation. 
In the owner-occupied sector, the main excluding factor is of course the lack of economic 
means among immigrants, and among Non-Europeans in particular. In the cooperative 
sector, the ban to unconditionally let one’s dwelling for rent causes segmentation as 
cooperatives cannot house renters. In addition, the purchasers of cooperatives have to 
be accepted by the local cooperative association before moving in, which has resulted 
in alleged discrimination. Immigrants may not have got permission to move in despite 
closed bargain.55 In the rental sector, many of the big landlords apply quota in the name 
of suppressing segregation, but such measures may in fact deepen segregation.56 In 
addition, the rental sector is not uniform. For instance in the Stockholm region, rentals 
are not immediately available, and the time span from the date of signing up to the date of 
receiving a dwelling may stretch over a decade. This of course excludes immigrants, who 
must get accommodation immediately.  As a result, in rentals in central parts of cities, 
ethnic Swedes are well represented for the simple reason of the queueing system. These 
are also the rentals that have been most attractive for being reshaped into cooperatives, 
and apt to speculation.57
53  Statistics Stockholm, Statistics Helsinki
54  Interviews in Uppsala 2013
55  Journalisten.se, 2008
56  Popoola 2001
57  Bengs 2010
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5 Housing policy
The aims
Housing policy has got an impressive history in Sweden. From 1912 to 1918, the Housing 
Commission was acting and accomplished the first census.58 From 1933 to 1947 the social 
implications of housing were investigated by a governmental committee.59 As part of this 
work, the overall aims of Swedish housing were formulated in the 1940s, and they still seem 
to be a viable legacy.60 A governmental proposition of 1967 summarised a longstanding 
discussion by stating that “the whole population is entitled to sound, spacious, well designed 
and appropriately equipped dwellings of good quality to reasonable prices”.61  
In the Swedish Constitution (Instrument of Government), the public institutions shall 
secure the right to “employment, housing and education”.62  In a governmental guideline 
document of 1974, the idea of housing as a social right was stated as well as the aim of 
tenure neutrality.63 This formulation supposedly indicated that all modes of tenure are 
equally valid and that housing policy should not favour any particular tenure. Regardless 
tenure, quality standards were mandatory, and high-quality housing was supposed to be 
equally available for all in need.64 Preferences were thought to materialise regardless of 
economic means.65 In pursuing the principle of tenure neutrality, taxation measures and 
housing allowances have been employed. 
58  Bostadskommissionen 1912–1918
59  Bostadssociala utredningen 1933–1948
60  SOU (1945:63)
61  Proposition 1967:100. “Hela befolkningen skall beredas sunda, rymliga, välplanerade och ändamålsenliga 
bostäder av god kvalitet till skäliga kostnader”
62  The Instrument of Government of Sweden, Chapter 1, Article 2 states: “Public power shall be exercised 
with respect for the equal worth of all and the liberty and dignity of the individual. The personal, economic 
and cultural welfare of the individual shall be fundamental aims of public activity. In particular, the public 
institutions shall secure the right to employment, housing and education, and shall promote social care 
and social security, as well as favourable conditions for good health.” http://www.riksdagen.se/en/Docu-
ments-and-laws/Laws/The-Constitution/ 
63  Riktlinjer for bostadspolitiken; Bengtsson 2001, 273
64  Christophers 2013, 894 
65  Holmqvist & Magnusson Turner 2013, 122
34 The housing regime of Sweden: Concurrent challenges
The Swedish housing policy has been aimed at non-selectivity, which indicates that 
the target group comprises the whole population and not just particular segments. 
Swedish public housing policy has thus pursued universality, offering rental housing 
to all households regardless of income level and the concept “social housing” has been 
banned because of its allegedly stigmatising effect.66 The expansion of public housing was 
supposed to harness speculation, and to stabilise the rental level as well as to promote 
housing production and moderate the fluctuations of the business cycle.67 Particularly the 
extensive rent bans are supposed to have restricted speculation in housing.68 In this mode 
of thinking, “speculation” was associated with individuals, but not with firms, because 
privately as well as publicly owned rental companies were allowed to operate. Firms were 
obliged to be sound, i.e. to make a surplus, but individuals were deprived of this very same 
right on moral grounds. Housing, defined as a right and a necessity of living, was excluded 
as a target for speculative actions emerging from individuals. The logic behind the notion 
that profit seeking is morally acceptable for firms, but not for individuals, remains a 
brainteaser. 
In a governmental proposition of 1997, housing was still considered a social right, which 
must be addressed by policy measures.  According to a proposition of 2008, the aim of 
the housing market (sic!) was to facilitate for the match of supply and demand. In 2010, 
a governmental proposition omitted the idea of reasonable costs from the aims.  The 
law for municipal housing companies changed in 2011 and the requirement for applying 
commercial principles was included, but combined with the old tenet of public interest. 
The law does not, however, define the meaning of “commercial”.  Tenants’ union has come 
up with an interpretation according to which it is a question of attitude, and not that public 
landlords should seek profits like private ones. In a governmental proposition of 2012, the 
buzzword of sustainable urban structures was omitted.  
The outcome
Despite the high-flown tenets of Swedish housing policy, the results have been modest. 
Spatial standards are not exceptionally high, housing is not very affordable, most of the 
environmental heritage is gone forever while its last vestige is now highly appreciated, but 
still under threat of demolition. Moreover, spatial segregation and racialisation of space is 
deeply rooted. The mismatch between aims and outcome may not be a great surprise in the 
light of international experience. The whole idea of policy aims is of course to indicate all 
the good things to come rather than to elaborate forecasts. Aims are meant for mobilising 
political support and for justifying chosen solutions. Policy aims are part of justification, 
seldom the cause of events. Accordingly, it seems unfair to ridicule Swedish housing policy 
on the ground that it has not been very successful in delivering all that was promised. In its 
shortcomings, it resembles the housing policy of almost any country. But is this really the 
point? No, the point is that despite dubious results, the chosen policy has been prolonged 
for 70 years or more, and it is still going strong! It has been sustained during left- and 
66  Boverket 2007, 13; Bengtsson 2006, 101–102
67  Bengtsson 2006, 112-114; Bengtsson 2001; Niva 1989, 152; Franzen & Sandstedt 1993, 201-202).
68  Under way is a small step liberalization of the market for renting cooperatives, but they are still heavily 
restricted. See Hyresnamnden 2014; Regeringskansliet 2014
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right-wing governments and proved remarkably stable. This is certainly manifest in the 
concurrent discussion on Swedish housing policy. 
Researchers seem to focus on public management and housing policy in the alleged context 
of liberalised market forces, but little is said about the particular structural properties 
of Swedish housing and the peculiarities of the society at large. Lately, a number of 
researchers seem to have captured the insight that housing needs are related to economic 
means.69 The meaning of “reasonable costs” is not defined in policy documents and even 
state agencies seem to realise that “reasonable” is relative to available means.70 A recent 
and politically easy solution is found by simply dropping the claim for reasonable costs.71 
This has been considered an indication of a shift from regulations and restrictions to a 
market based housing policy, attributed to global neoliberal trends.72 Such assessments 
are fairly hazardous in the face of the Swedish housing regime, still largely founded on 
other principles than open markets. A more moderate view of an external observer states 
that the dismantling and retaining of market restrictions still coincide.73
Public housing has lost some of its previous advantages and thereby its operational 
conditions started to resemble those of the privately owned rental firms.74 One stated 
reason for implemented reforms was public savings while another reason was to provide 
for a larger set of consumer choices.75 Despite changes, the negotiation system of the 
rental sector has been retained.76 The need to comply with EU directives has also forced 
alterations for determining rents, which was changed in 2011.77 The idea of a universal, 
non-selective housing policy has been cast in doubt, but this doubt has remained fairly 
unformulated on the level of discourse. The question arises whether the principle of 
universality should be replaced for a legislation in support of those most in need of housing. 
The changes that occurred after reforms of the 1990s seem to have caused increased 
spatial segregation and segmentation according to tenure, declined housing production 
and the change of municipal housing companies toward more commercial approaches as 
well as weakened commitments to public housing. With reduced public support, investors, 
municipalities and households are supposed to face bigger risks.78 The change has been 
interpreted as follows: “long-standing formulations including ambitious goals of equality, 
social responsibility, high standards, reasonable cost and good living conditions were 
erased”.79 Such concerns may indicate reluctance to accept inherent market dynamics, but 
also misconception and overrating of factual achievements. 
69  Hedin et al. 2011; Holmqvist & Magnusson Turner 2013; Christophers 2013
70  Boverket 2007, 7
71  Prop. 2010/11:1
72  Andersson & Magnusson Turner 2014, 2; Hedin et al. 2011; Holmqvist & Magnusson Turner 2013
73  Christophers 2013
74  Boverket 2008, 20)
75  Bolinder 2009,3; Boverket 2007, 25; 
76  Hedin et al. 2011, 444–445
77  Boverket 2012; Christophers 2013, 393
78  Clark & Johnson 2009, 184–185; Hedin et al. 2011, 446; Boverket 2008, 20
79  Clark & Johnson 2009
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All rents are still centrally negotiated above the head of single tenants and public housing is 
still seen as an important means for pursuing affordable housing.80  In market economies, 
market rents tend to increase during booms, but decrease during slumps. As proposed in 
this study, the regulated rents in Sweden seem to operate the other way around, reaching 
their peaks during slumps. In general, regulated rents tend to rise modestly, but in the long 
run they face the risk of increasing the overall rental level and housing costs in general.81 
This is actually what seems to happen in Sweden, and it is one of the factors behind the 
introduction of tenure neutrality. In practice, regulation of rents seems to be related to the 
creation of prolific markets for commercial and public firms, and, in the light of available 
data, the rationale is evidently to secure the profitability of rental companies. 
80  Andersson & Magnusson Turner 2014; Christophers 2013, 898
81  Bengs 1989; Bengs & Rönkä 1994
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6 An interpretation 
In the introduction, the connection between the housing regime and the particular features 
of the housing market were shortly presented. The market has here been conceptualised 
in terms of its composition, structure and scope, and all these matters are thought to be 
decisive for the particular features of the Swedish housing regime. In a broader context, 
the prevailing elites, the ideologies they profess, and the applied housing policies, all 
together maintain the stability of the housing regime (Figure 12). 
Figure 12. A model for interpreting the housing regime of Sweden
One reason for attempting to interpret the Swedish housing regime is its high international 
profile. For years it has been standing out as a unique way of dealing with the kind of housing 
issues that have been considered problematic in many countries. The assumed excellence 
of the Swedish regime have since long been fading away, but the prevailing housing policy 
has been maintained for decades and amended with mostly minor adjustments. The 
mediocre results thus call for investigating the reasons to the uniquely long-standing 
housing policy of the country. If the dwellers do not overtly benefit from the cemented 
housing regime, somebody probably does. 
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The composition of the housing market
The composition of the Swedish housing market is peculiar indeed with a share of owner-
occupied dwellings that amount to less than 40 per cent of the national stock. This is the 
only part of all the dwellings that are affiliated with extensive property right: they can 
be freely sold and bought on the market, and they can be freely rented further by their 
owners as well. The cooperatives (some 20 per cent) can be freely sold and bought on the 
market, but cannot as a rule be rented further. The rents of the rental sector are regulated 
all through, and rentals cannot legally be rented out by the initial renter for an indefinite 
period. If renting is temporally allowed for acceptable reasons by the rental company, or the 
local cooperative in case of cooperatives, rents are not supposed to generate profits for the 
ordinary possessor of the dwelling. These restrictions have generated a black market for 
second and third hand renting – in the metropolitan regions in particular where demand 
constantly excesses supply. The existence of black rental markets is institutionalised due 
to the queueing practice. Getting a rental legally in expanding regions, implies queueing for 
years, which excludes those in need of instant housing such as immigrants and temporal 
work force. 
The structure of the housing market
A repercussion of the composition of the housing market is concentrated ownership. The 
private rentals are owned by private companies, the public ones by public companies. 
Most of the cooperative sector is associated to a few national unions of cooperatives (HSB, 
Riksbyggen). Only the ownership of owner-occupied houses is dispersed as the owners 
are mostly individuals. One dramatic effect of the concentrated institutional ownership 
is reduced competition among suppliers, which is reinforced by rent regulation. Lack of 
competition and the non-existence of market rents have caused a long-term increase in 
the overall rental level of the country, which exceeds overall price-rises of owner-occupied 
and cooperative dwellings.
The monopolist tendencies due to concentrated ownership of the housing stock is mirrored 
in increasingly concentrated production and a land and planning policy in favour of the 
biggest developers. On the national level, a handful oligopolies are in charge and on the 
local level the situation turns very often monopolistic. The big boost for big players took 
place during the Million Dwelling Programme (1965–74). Production was concentrated 
by applying and selectively allocating national production quota as well as by favouring 
big projects and all-inclusive contracts. Quality stipulations and standardisation suited 
the biggest producers (e.g. restricting use of timber). A new market for newly produced 
dwellings was also promoted by extensive demolition and reduction of the older housing 
stock. 82
The scope of the housing market
In the traditional urban context of Sweden, towns were built according to traditional town 
plans, characterised by a network of public areas (streets, squares, technical infrastructure, 
82  Bengs 2010b
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parks, etc.) and blocks of plots, which were exploited one by one. This formed the frame for 
small scale building and the use of local entrepreneurs and craftsmanship. The traditional 
way of building towns has got its roots already in Greek and Roman Antiquity and was 
maintained during centuries until the advent of large scale industrialism towards the 
end of the 19th century. In the old-fashioned way of housing, dwellings were as a rule 
erected by their future users. The housing market emerged as a result of housing being 
commercialised.83 
The planning and buildings code of 1987 is a token of shaping the legal framework for a 
new building market, founded on large scale projects and big entrepreneurs. It has had 
the effect of producing a constant under-supply of building land in favour of the biggest 
producers, possessing extensive land banks. Small local entrepreneurs have been knocked 
out and the biggest firms operate nation-wide and internationally as well. In this way, the 
changing structure of the housing market has altered the scope of the market. 
Housing policy
The most fundamental effect of the applied housing policy should perhaps not be assessed 
in terms of aims and results, despite the fact that there is a mismatch between the two. 
Policies are not necessarily meant to be realised, but rather to mobilise political support. 
Besides its political implications, the Swedish housing policy has had a distinct effect by 
shaping the housing market described above. By promoting market restrictions in terms of 
assumed tenure neutrality, by enforcing rent regulation and neglecting the occurrence of 
black markets, by defining quantitative goals and making them operational to the benefit of 
the few, a new kind of housing market has emerged. The main credit to be attributed to the 
executed housing policy is not the visible novelties, but the foundation and maintenance of 
a housing market with dramatic repercussions for ordinary citizens. 
The Swedish housing policy possesses another feature as well, which has come to resemble 
a general template for policy making: Particular solutions (i.e. “the new housing market”) 
are advocated by associating them with all good things in life. The spectrum of aims to be 
achieved has been kept very wide, and it includes ethical as well as aesthetical matters. In 
short, the corollaries of housing policy can be found in a number of other fields of life, not 
just in planning and design, but in the most fundamental ways citizens organise their lives. 
Ideology
The new housing market required of course the idea of progress, which was essential for 
the destruction of urban heritage and demolition of cheap housing. The newly emerging 
architecture (“functionalism”) had to be promoted by making industrialism a virtue 
compared to handicraft. Sweden is surely fairly unique in terms of comprehensiveness 
and systematised action for implementing modernism – not just modernisation. It has 
even got nationalistic overtones: “The Swedish style”. Do not mock Swedish housing, 
because then you mock the deepest sentiments of the generations that have been brought 
up in these neighbourhoods!
83  Bengs 2010a
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If functionalism and modernistic design could be said to constitute the aesthetical 
dimension of the prevailing housing ideology, then the idea of housing as a “right” may be 
seen as a prerogative of common man. If housing is considered a right of every individual, 
someone else has to satisfy that individual, if required. This constitutes the ideological 
fundament of the implemented massive housing policy. The “right” could of course have 
been accomplished in radically different ways than the factually implemented ones, which 
includes strong concentration of ownership and production, and restricted markets. 
Everyone could for instance have been given the “right” to build his/her own house and 
to use it as profitable investment. The “right” to a home, is in fact reduced to the right to 
a quite specified home, determined by the housing regime.  
Concentration of political power
In many respects, the Swedish society is characterised by centralised, large-scale 
solutions, matching a concentrated corporate sector. This is mirrored in the concentration 
of political power as well. In the following some peculiarities are mentioned:
The Swedish constitution does not demand majority government as long as the cabinet 
gains the support of the parliament. Consequently, a minority government has to secure 
support for every voting in parliament by making bargains, which most of the time remain 
unknown to the public. Thus parliamentarian proceedings remain largely obscure to 
outsiders. 
In ballots for parliament, votes are not cast for individual candidates but for parties or 
party coalitions, and the success of single candidates depends on their respective position 
on the party list of candidates.84 In practice, the party headquarters thus strongly influence 
who gets elected. Party leaders are the main figures in Swedish politics, which of course 
centralises and cements political power and makes deals between leaders of parties more 
easy to make. 
Organisations across the country avoid balloting representatives for leading posts. The 
leadership of the Social Democrats (SAP) seems to have been too important as to be put at 
stake: Till this day, the chairman has never been elected by ballot. 
The cabinet takes all decisions unanimously, which for outsiders obscures the 
understanding of decision-making as diversity of opinions among cabinet ministers never 
become manifest.
The celebrated “Swedish model” is commonly associated with a smooth running society 
that avoids conflicts. Consensus is found in public committees and commissions, 
where professionals and interest groups can meat, discuss, form opinions and phrase 
legislation to be formalised in the parliament. The core of the model, however, consists 
of the smooth collaboration between employers and employees. In 1938, the government 
forced the confederation of trade unions (LO) to make a deal with the confederation of 
employers (SAF), which included restrictions on employed measures in case of conflict, 
84  This is still a valid description, despite some recent modifications of the system.
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and a total denial of conflicts that could jeopardise society.85 The agreement is called 
the Saltsjöbadenavtalet. The prime minister at the time was Per Albin Hansson of SAP. 
With regard to the centralisation and concentration of power in Sweden, the effects of 
the agreement were dramatic for the trade unions. The practice of LO was changed from 
a bottom-up to a top-down ordinance, which had to be implemented by change of by-laws 
of the LO and its member unions. 
The deal between the trade unions and the employers’ associations, resulted in a standing 
form of negotiations, which included not only matters related to labour costs or safety, 
but to a variety of matters affecting the price and quality of labour. The idea of social 
engineering, so typical to Sweden, emerged from this practice. The implications are 
wide-ranging. A good many things that in distinctly parliamentarian countries would 
be subjected to the scrutiny of MPs, are in Sweden processed by the corporatist system. 
This is often carried out in commissions and committees formed by the cabinet. Deals 
are reached in negotiations among a very limited number of elite representatives, which 
then “anchor” them in their respective organisations and bring the agreements down 
the ladder to all the subordinates. The employers’ organisations do not have to maintain 
a façade of egalitarianism since output in their world is relative to input, and they do not 
have to bother all that much about justification as deals can be marketed by using rational 
arguments according to foreseen returns. Trade unions have to consider the ideological 
repercussions of deals as well. The unions have to present the top-down process as 
a bottom-up movement, traditionally labelled “people’s movement” (folkrörelse). For the 
public, agreements are neutrally labelled “reforms” (or “victories” for political activists). 
The formation of housing costs could be mentioned as an example of the top-down model. 
Elite strategy
The features of any national elite reflect concentration of political, economic and 
ideological power. The Swedish society could be labelled bipolar. Two-block politics (Left 
and Right) has been prevailing since the early decades of the 20th century, and, despite 
changing coalitions, it is still a reality. The Left has nourished something that could be 
called statism,86 with the sedate consent of the Right.87 This kind of bipolarity is by no 
way unique for the Swedish society. It can be found in most countries with representative 
85  The trade unions of the employees were in 1898 organised into a federation called Landsorganisationen 
i Sverige (Swedish Trade Union Confederation). The employers organised themselves into a federation in 
1902, called Sveriges arbetsgivarförening SAF (now approximately Svenskt näringsliv or Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise). 
86  A peculiar rhetoric of the social democrats has been to speak about “the strong society” (det starka sam-
hället) when they actually mean the strong state.
87  At the end of the 19th and early 20th century, Sweden had a liberal party of some significance, which 
joined force with the social democrats (SAP) in the political struggle for suffrage. The liberal party gradu-
ally lost support while SAP grew stronger and formed cabinets four times already during the 20s. The SAP 
was founded in 1898 and rejected Marxism from the outset in the favour of something that has been la-
belled “democratic revisionism”. Socialism was not considered an aim, but equalled the politics of the party. 
Throughout its history, the party has been very pragmatic and appropriated the nationalistic agenda of the 
right already in the 20s. Part of its ideology goes back to the ideas of Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) and some 
of the buzzwords of SAP came to inspire the Nazis of Germany: Peoples home (Volkgemeinschaft), national 
socialism (Nazionalsozialismus), geopolitics (Lebensraum, Blut und Boden) and eugenics (Rassenhygiene). 
Berman 2007; Sabine & Thorson 1981; Bengs 2010
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democracy and parliamentarian system.88 The peculiarity of the Swedish model may not 
lie in its bipolarity, but in the systematic way both groupings have promoted concentration 
of economic and political power. The extraordinary concentration of wealth discussed 
above is both a token of, and a prerequisite for prevailing elite strategies developed over 
decades. During a 74 year period (1932–2006) the social democrats headed cabinets for 
altogether 65 years, much of it as a minority government, which may indicate the silent 
support of the political right. 
For the social democrats of the SAP, the political significance of the Swedish model was 
of course crucial as the trade unions provided the political left with power that by far 
exceeded their parliamentarian strength. The political success of the social democrats 
may be explained by the fact that they already in pre-war times deliberately sought to 
feature themselves as tracking a “third road” apart from existing socialism overseas, or 
the disasters of unrestricted commerce. Their broad marking of the political centre was 
of course a precondition for gaining wide support, which at its best covered half of the 
voters. The “genuine” left remained a threat to the hegemony of SAP, but much of the 
rhetoric of the party had to mimic the rhetoric of the radicals. In combination with a very 
large organisation for intelligence, which targeted leftists on the factory floor, these two 
measures (rhetoric and spying) contributed to the party’s influence.89 
The social democrats of Sweden have had a crucial influence on the Swedish housing regime. 
The main policy documents referred to above are directly associated with the party already 
for the simple reason of the party’s hegemonic position in post war politics.  The party has 
actively sought the image of being the warrantor of decent and affordable housing. That 
does not include housing only, but a multitude of services and income transfers provided 
by the welfare state. The sustainability of the welfare state is rhetorically connected to the 
party’s rationale. The more everyday living is dependent on politics, the easier it is to get 
support for those parties that are associated with the tenets of the welfare state. The less 
people in common have economic buffers of their own, such as home ownership, the more 
they are dependent on the income transfers of the welfare state. That is enhanced in the 
concurrent situation with the international trend of dismantling welfare. 
What about the Right elite and its possible gains with regard to the implemented housing 
regime? Private rental companies, owning about half of the rental stock, have gained from 
sustained and secured increase of rents, hooking on the public sector’s perpetual rise of 
rents. In terms of its own living costs and living environment, the Right has been favoured 
by advantageous owner-occupation and segmentation by inhabiting some of the most 
segregated areas (purely ethnic Swedes!) itself. If someone holds historical environment 
88  Its root can be traced back to Antique times and the emergence of democracy in ancient Greece. Fustel de 
Coullanges 1980
89  The SAP controlled an undercover network of 20 000 informers (arbetsplatsombud), which was unveiled 
in the early 70s. The activity was eventually fused to the espionage of the army of Sweden. The poor journal-
ists, Jan Guillou and Peter Bratt, who uncovered the espionage of the SAP, were thrown into jail. The parallel 
to the concurrent cases of Assange and Snowden are obvious.  The keen connection between labour organisa-
tion and the party is manifest in the practice of LO trade unions, according to which trade union membership 
automatically meant SAP-membership as well. This was ended only in 1991. The youth organisation of the 
party still operates as the youth organisation of the LO as well. Since 2008, membership in a populist right-
wing party called Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) is an impediment to any position of trust in the 
LO.
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in high esteem, it can still be bought. With regard to the elites, all these matters may 
however be of marginal importance compared to the overall benefit of the way production 
of housing is organised. 
The bipolar elite of Sweden has in concerted action unanimously supported big enterprise. 
Concentration of housing production and development was in fact sought after by both 
elites. Suitable conditions for the growth of monopolies were provided by the post-war 
housing policy. The elite of the Right, representing developers, investors and finance, 
promoted concentration in the private sector and got a big boost by the centralised 
housing policy in general and by the Million Programme of 1965–74 in particular. The 
social democratic dream of having only two blocks of developers/producers of houses, 
the cooperative and the private ones, was eventually scuppered by the saturated housing 
market of the late 1970s. The private sector subsequently occurred as the victor of that 
particular battle, and the trade union-led production lost ground. The symbiosis between 
the two blocks was however not been jeopardised as ownership and operation of public 
rentals and cooperatives still remains within the auspices of the Left. The resentment of 
the Left to expanding property rights in the rental and cooperative sectors seems to reflect 
the need to keep track of the flows of assets of those sectors. The big institutional owners 
of public rentals and cooperatives do not want to lose their business. 
As shown above, the lacking opportunity for individuals to profit on renting has directed 
individuals to invest in financial assets, to the advantage of listed firms. For the Right, 
this means excessively available capital to listed firms and financial institutions. For the 
common population, it means increased dependence on the welfare system due to lack of 
secure personal assets, and therefore a necessity to bond with the Left in order to secure 
public services in the future. 
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7 Epilogue
Maybe the scrutiny of the Swedish housing regime in this report is truthful and pertinent. 
All the same, this does not indicate an assessment of the executed policy or an evaluation 
of the quality of the Swedish housing regime. In order to do that, we should apply standards 
with regard to how it could have been (in the best of worlds). That would however mean 
to apply a counterfactual type of argumentation, and then we would apart ourselves from 
scientific research. We only know (some of ) what happened, not how it could have been 
made in a better way. What we can criticise, however, is how housing issues have been 
studied. 
It is both absurd and sad that those researchers who have delivered critique against the 
alleged liberalisation of housing in Sweden, in fact attend to the neoliberal notion of 
markets as a force of nature to be tamed, and not as an outcome of more or less conscious 
acts, a societal construct – by the elite and for the elite – over a considerable period of time. 
The notion of beneficial public regulation in the face of the haunting market is underpinned 
by a Hobbesian view on the nature of society and legitimate government.90 In the Swedish 
discourse on housing, markets are as a rule viewed as the monstrous Leviathan by the 
proponents of the existing system. The Hobbesian view implies a legitimate government 
based on civil society, placed under the auspices of a sovereign authority and framed by 
a social contract and total submission to authority. The subjects themselves are claimed to 
be the common authority as they are the ones who have rendered submission possible by 
giving up their personal authority. Without a contract, the monster is set free:
In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: 
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities 
that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and 
removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; 
no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual 
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short.91
In a simulacrum of the Hobbesian approach, the relation between state and housing 
market has been defined, and the Swedish housing model is said to imply the modification 
90  Hobbes wrote that civil war and the brute situation of a state of nature (“the war of all against all”) could 
only be avoided by strong and undivided government.
91  Hobbes 2005, Chapter XIII.: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind As Concerning Their Felicity, and 
Misery.
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of markets by the state, allegedly to the benefit of all subjects.92 In this kind of approach, 
markets have potentially always been there, but in order to master their assumed 
dysfunctions, the state has to step in. In the study at hand on the contrary, housing in 
Sweden is considered to be a continued process of establishing very particular conditions, 
favours for the biggest, and maintaining them to the best of elite knowledge and interest. 
This means that the substantivist approach to economy is applied. The concept of housing 
market, and all it stands for, is comprehended as a deliberately constructed and maintained 
way of safeguarding particular economic and political interests. 
The abject conditions of housing research in Sweden may be understandable against the 
backdrop of institutionalised research. At an early stage, the production of ideology was 
organised to frame politics under the direct auspices of the government. The State Board 
for Housing Research (Statens nämnd för byggnadsforskning) was founded in 1942, and 
in 1960 it was split in two, one part was called the State Council for Building Research 
(Statens råd för byggnadsforskning) and the other part was called The State Institute for 
Building Research (Statens institut för byggnadsforskning, SIB). These governmental 
institutions were part of a broad network that was supervised by the national cabinet. State 
institutes would as a rule get their funding, guidelines and commissions from national 
government. Concurrently most of research is integrated into universities, but the state 
control is still executed by public research funds, which get their policy guidelines on an 
annual basis from the national government. A further enforcement of political control 
has taken place in the way universities are managed. The social democratic hegemony in 
2005, just before their defeat in the parliamentary election that year, was impressive. In 
the board of directors of all universities in the country, they had a qualified majority as well 
as in the case of 22 colleges. The same year, more than 80 per cent of the chairpersons of 
cultural institutions were social democrats.93 
In the long run, the quality of research is more dependent on critically operating institutions 
than on smart and skillful researchers. Critique thrives in independence. Commissioned 
research always reflects the aspirations of the commissioner, and the distinction between 
critical scrutiny and justification gets easily blurred.
92  Bengtsson 1995
93  Bengs 2010b, 74. The wanting critical research may be a major explanation to missing overall perspec-
tive. Sadly enough, the Danish fairy tale of H.C. Andersen called “The Emperor’s New Clothes” is still topical. 
Andersen 1980
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